In the summer of 1992, I joined hundreds of protesters outside the Royal Court of Justice in the Strand to call for justice for Kiranjit Ahluwalia, who had killed her husband after years of being subject to his cruel and abusive behaviour. She had been convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, unable to avail herself of the partial defences to murder of provocation and diminished responsibility. The campaign for Kiranjit’s release was led by the redoubtable Southall Black Sisters and the slogans on our banners and placards read, ‘women’s tradition, struggle not submission’ ‘domestic violence is provocation’, ‘self defence is no offence’ and ‘you can’t beat a woman’.
Inside the Court of Appeal, the case was presided over by the Lord Chief Justice and all eyes were on the arguments as to whether the judgement would recognise that the abuse Kiranjit had suffered amounted to ‘provocation’ under the law sufficient to partially excuse her actions in killing him.
At this time, in the early 1990s, as campaigners highlighted, many men who killed their wives and female partners could successfully argue provocation by citing her alleged adultery or ‘nagging’ behaviour.
At this time, in the early 1990s, as campaigners highlighted, many men who killed their wives and female partners could successfully argue provocation by citing her alleged adultery or ‘nagging’ behaviour. In one notorious case, the judge told Joseph McGrail that the wife he killed “would try the patience of a saint’ and sentenced him to two years. However, the Court of Appeal did not extend the provocation defence to the circumstances of the Killing of Deepak Ahluwalia who had fallen asleep before she poured petrol over him and set him alight. Whilst the court importantly recognised that a loss of control following the provocation should be ‘sudden’ (to use the language of the defence) it did not have to be immediate. But the longer the time lapse between the provoking behaviour and the fatal act, the less likely provocation was to succeed. Instead, however, the court allowed her appeal admitting fresh evidence of endogenous depression that the court recognised may have diminished her responsibility for the killing.
Fast forward twenty seven years and the slightly less unruly protesters have returned to the Royal Courts of Justice. This time I am part of the legal team that argues the appeal against her conviction for the murder of her husband, Richard, on behalf of Sally Challen. The placards and the publicity that precede her hearing focus on fresh evidence of the coercive and controlling behaviour that subjugated her over the forty year marriage.
Like Kiranjit Ahluwalia, Sally, who had never committed a violent act in her life, attacked Richard when he was least expecting it, striking him repeatedly over the head with a hammer. Again, as in Kiranjit’s case, the Court of Appeal were not convinced that the coercive and controlling behaviour would amount to provocation but the accepted fresh evidence of psychiatric disorder that they ruled may have diminished Sally’s responsibility for the killing.
So after nearly 30 years of campaigning the Court of Appeal, it seems, finds it hard to accept that a woman subject to years of abuse could be driven to kill her abuser.
So after nearly 30 years of campaigning the Court of Appeal, it seems, finds it hard to accept that a woman subject to years of abuse could be driven to kill her abuser. Instead they prefer to pathologise the actions of the defendant, recognising her human (possibly female) frailty rather than the provoking conduct of the man she killed. Yet the courts may lag behind public opinion and the outpouring of sympathy and identification expressed in the media and by so many women who have experienced similar treatment. The overwhelming impression we are left with in both cases was that each woman killed because of the provocation she was subjected to, in Kiranjit’s case that of domestic violence and in Sally’s case, coercive and controlling behaviour. And in both cases, whilst the appeal was successful only on grounds of fresh evidence relating to diminished responsibility, the greater understanding engendered by the public campaigning may open the door to others in similar circumstances, to argue that the abuse they were subjected amounted to provocation.
Just two months after Sally’s appeal, 70 year old Packiam Ramanathan stood trial at the Old Bailey for the murder of her abusive husband. Evidence of coercive and controlling behaviour was put before the jury and it took them little time to return a verdict of manslaughter. Three years after, Kiranjit’s appeal, Emma Humphreys case came before the court of appeal, again accompanied by a high profile campaign highlighting the extreme abuse she had been subjected to over her lifetime and in the final year by her dangerous and abusive ‘boyfriend’/pimp, Trevor Armitage who she had killed. In that case the court recognised that cumulative provocation should have been considered and allowed her appeal.
What can we learn from these cases and the ongoing struggle to get the criminal justice system to recognise the context of serious domestic abuse (whether in the form of physical and sexual violence or more systematic coercive and controlling behaviour)? If nothing else, than we have to continue articulating, arguing and campaigning so that women like Sally and Kiranjit do not suffer and silence and that justice is delivered.
Join Kiranjit and Sally with campaigners from Southall Black Sisters and Justice for Women to discuss their cases and what has changed over time, at this year’s Emma Humphreys Memorial Prize event, 8th November, Oxford House, Bethnal Green.
Justice for Women are campaigning around the murder appeals of two other women due to have hearings before the end of the year. Please visit their website for more information - www.justiceforwomen.org.uk
Harriet Wistrich is the director of Centre for Women’s Justice and co-founder of Justice for Women. She is also a trustee of the Emma Humphrey’s Memorial Prize.